NASA/ESA CV-990 Spacelab Simulation (ASSESS 2) by unknown
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19780022206 2020-03-22T03:42:20+00:00Z
11^V7.^w , ^aw^a^sa^—
^ s
HAMPI ON, Vi
EP 79'9
	
.
nO	 Pr(,f-,
w ^^ Stl tZLl11
NASA/AMES RESEARCH CENTER, MOFFETT FIELD, CALIFORNIA
1
^	 a
i
r.
1i'e
,y
®	 4 'i
} f s
I .^
!3
y.
Or
s
t
5
3.
Y
L
r	 `
0 .
i +
F	 _
EXECUTIVE SMOIARx
NASA/ESA CV-990
SPACELAB SIMULATION
(ASSESS II)
A Joint Endeavor By
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the European Space Agency
APPROVED: B. T. Nolan, NASA OA	 APPROVED: W. 0. Armstrong, NASA, OSF
/ f CCI^ti`
APPROVED:	 de Waard, ESA, SPICE
July 1977
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.	 INTRODUCTION 1
2.	 THE ASSESS II PROJECT 2
3.	 BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION 3
3.1 Mission Background 3i
3.2 Mission Objectives 3
3.3 Project Guidelines 4
3.4 Mission Management 5
3.4.1	 Mission Steering Group (MSG) 5
' 3.4.2	 Management Structure and Responsibilities 5
3.4.3	 Mission Scientist and Investigator Working Group (IWG) 5
3.4.4	 Mission Specialist (M/S) 5
3.4.5	 Payload Specialist (P/S) 7
3.5 Flight Payload 7
4.	 MISSION IMPLEMENTATION 10
4.1 General 10
4.2 Experiment Selection and Funding 10
4.3 Investigator Requirements Document (IRD) 10
4.4 Analytical Integration 12
4.5 Investigator Working Group Activities 12
4.6 Payload Specialist /Mission Specialist
Selection and Training Activities 12
4.7 Integration of ESA Payload in Europe 13
4.8 System Level Payload Integration (Level IV Integration) 13
£. 4.9 Launch Site Payload Processing (Level III/II%I Integration) 17
f
4.10 Mission Control Center and Payload Operations
Control Center (MCC and POCC) 17
4.11 Conduct of the Flight Mission 18
4.12 Use cf Central Data System 20_
4.13 Documentation 21
5.	 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS FOR SPACELAB 24
5.1 Introduction 24
5.2 Payload Selection. and Funding 25
5.2.1	 Payload Selection 25
5.2.2	 Payload Funding 26
5.3 Management Relations 27
5.4 Pre-Flight Planing ar.d Payload Integration 29
5.4.1	 Investigators` Working Group 29
5.4.2	 Investigator Requirements Document (IRD) 29
5.4.3	 Analytical Integration 31
5.4.4	 Integration of ESA Payload in Europe 31
5.4.5	 System level Payload Integration (Level IV) 31
5.4.6	 Launch Site Payload Processing (Levels III, II, I) 32
5.4.7	 Safety 34
5.5 Payload Flight Crew 35
5.6 Flight/Ground Operations Interactions 39
5.7 Experiment Hardware Considerations 40
5.8 Data Handling 41
=A 5.9 Documentation 42
List of Acronyms 44
Reference 1	 `^ 44
a _?
1.	 INTRODUCTION
This Executive Summary represents an initial report and briefly
covers the highlights of the ASSESS * 7I Project.	 The report is in three
main sections.	 The first parts cover factually, without analysis, the
background, project organization, and project implementation.	 These first
parts are intended to serve as background for the last section which
presents results and brief evaluations of major issues and activities of
particular interest in Spacelab planning.
Information for this report was obtained from the records of a team
of observers, a general mission debriefing, interviews with participants,8	 8 ^	 P	 P	 ,
{i and the mission documentation.	 NASA and ESA personnel joined in preparation
of this report immediately following the close of the mission.
2.	 THE ASSESS PROJECT
The ASSESS II project was a detailed simulation of Spacelab operations
using the NASA/Ames Research Center CV-990 aircraft laboratory (Fig. 1) to
represent the Shuttle carrier and Spacelab pressurized module/pallet
combination to carry a complex payload of experiments in a manner similar
to that planned for the Spacelab era.	 The project was carried out for the
benefit of Spacelab planning to identify and analyze cost-effective techniques
for addressing management and operational acitivities. 	 It was a cooperative
project between NASA and ESA with payload and flight responsibilities
assigned to those organizations which have -Waen given those responsibilities
for early Spacelabs.
The project covered a period of approximately eighteen months from
initial approval to flight, and studied the full range of Spacelab-type
activities including.
Management interactions
- Experiment selection
- Hardware development
- Payload integration and checkout
- Mission Specialist (M/S) and Payload Specialist (P/S)
selection and training
- Mission Control Center/Payload Operations Control Center
interactions with ground and flight problems
- Real time interaction during flight between Principal
Investigators (PIs) and the Mission Specialist/Payload
Specialist flight crew
- Retrieval of scientific data and analysis
*	 ASSESS is an acronym for Airborne Science/Spacelab Experiments System
Simulation.	 A list of other acronyms and abbreviations is given on
page 44.
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3. BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION
3.1	 Mission Background
The ASSESS Program was initiated by the AirborneSeience Office (ASO) at
NASA/ARC to identify simplified low-cost techniques used by ASO	 in
integrating and carrying experiments aboard airborne laboratories which
eight be applied effectively to Spacelab. 	 Several ASSESS missions to
simulate Spacelab operations were conducted prior to ASSESS II including
one NASA/ESA joint mission aboard the CV-990 in 1975. 	 [Ref. 11
A decision was reached in late 1975 to conduct ASSESS II as a joint
mission sponsored by NASA Office of Applications (OA) and Office of Space
Flight (OSF) together with ESA. 	 Operational costs were shared.	 Experiments
from the U.S. were totally funded by NASA, while in Europe the basic
experiments were funded nationally with ESA providing funds to interface
the experiments into the ASSESS Mission.	 It was agreed to involve planned
Spacelab management elements to test and evaluate interface activities.
= MSFC was assigned responsibility for the payload and appointed a Mission
Manager, KSC was given responsibility for Launch Site Payload Processing,
and JSC was assigned Flight Operations--all working closely with ARC where
the aircraft was stationed and where the final integration and flight
phase would be conducted. 	 In Europe, their payload responsibility was
assigned to ESA/SPICE.
"launch"The mission received final approval in March 1976, and
occurred 14 months later on May 16, 1977.
3.2	 Mission Objectives
a)	 Science related
- Evaluate experiment selection procedures
- Evaluate participation of PI in mission planning and
implementation, and utilization of an Investigators'
_ Working Group (IWG) chaired by a Mission Scientist
- Maximize science data
b)	 Management
- Study proposed NASA and ESA/SPICE Spacelab payload
F
management concepts and interface relationships
- Evaluate Mission Manager, Mission Specialist, and
Payload Specialist roles in mission planning
and implementation
c)	 Analytical Engineering and Mission Planning
- Evaluate the methods and effectiveness of performing
analytical system engineering, mission flight
interface definition, and interface control
d)	 Payload Specialist Selection and Training
- Evaluate methodology of Payload Specialist selection
and training
` - Determine practicability of a PI as a Payload Specialist
3
e) Mission Specialist Selection and Training
- Evaluate the Mission Specialist responsibilities concerning:
1) requirements for managing and operating the
experiment support equipment
2) in-flight coordination and integration of the
payload operations
f) Ground Operations
- Identify ground operations and testing requirements for
efficient experiment integration and checkout
- Evaluate Mission Specialist, Payload Specialist, and PI
involvement in experiment ground operations
- D.iderscand and gain an appreciation of integration
activities pertinent to Spacelab payloads
g) Mission Planning and Flight Operations
- Assess methods and degree of real time experiment/mission
planning for Spacelab missions
- Evaluate concept of proxy operation and maintenance of
experiments by P/S during flight operations
- Evaluate POCC concept and operating procedures
h) Documentation
- Develop and evaluate minimum cost documentation approach
consistent with Spacelab payload requirements
3.3 Project Guidelines
Major ASSESS II project guidelines were as follows:
- Maximum Spacelab reality within funding limits and the limitations
inherent with aircraft operation
- Ten-day mission with payload crew confined to the aircraft and
contiguous living quarters with one aircraft flight planned
for each 24-hour period. The total of the aircraft flights
and confined periods betwe,!n flights to represent a single
Spacelab mission
- Payload crew to consist of two European Payload Specialists to
operate the ESA experiments, two U.S. Payload Specialists to
operate the NASA experiments, and one Mission Specialist.
No cross-training between :NASA and ESA experiments except for
the ESA medical experiment involving all Payload Specialists
- Communications with the ASSESS Spacelab crew to conform to actual
Spacelab communications procedures as far as practicable.
Communication to be established between the ground and the
aircraft throughout flight periods
- Centralized experiment control panels to be provided in the aircraft
- The aircraft flight crew (pilot, copilot, navigator) not to be
included in the simulation exercise
- A few unconstrained personnel (called ghosts) to participate in the
flights to assure continuous operation of basic aircraft systems
that were not designed for operation from the centralized control
panels
4
	1	 3.4 Mission Management
3.4.1 Mission Steering Groue (MSG)
An MSG was established at the beginning of the project with representatives
from every major participating organization. The MSG was unique to ASSESS,
and is not planned for Spacelab. The participating NASA Headquarters
program offices were represented along with MSFC, JSC, KSC, ARC, aad ESA
Headquarters and ESA/SPICE. The MSG was cochaired by representatives from
NASA/OA and ESA/SPICE. Four meetings were held.
Functions of the MSG were to provide overall guidance to the simulation
in order to achieve maximum benefit for Spacelab planning. Accordingly, the
%, G established the mission gu+dellnes and provided an overall managesent
forum for resolution of inter-center/agency responsibilities.
3.4.2 Management Structure and Responsibilities
Figure 2 shows the management structure, which with the exception of
the MSG, corresponds closely to that planned for early Spacelab missions.
3.4.3 Mission Scientist and Investigator Working Group (IWG)
A Mission Scientist, along with a Deputy Mission Scientist, were
appointed by MSFC. ESA also appointed a Mission Scientist from ESTEC.
An Investigators' Working Group (IWG) was established early in the
ASSESS II Project, and was made up of a PI from each experiment. The
Mission Scientist from MSFC chaired the IWG with the ESA Mission Scientist
as cochairman. Functions of the IWG were to provide a forum for PI
discussion and to make recommendations concerning science plans and
priorities for the mission. NASA and ESA IWG members provided
recommendations to their respective managements for Payload Specialist
selection. Two meetings were held.
3.4.4 Mission Specialist (M/S)
The Mission Specialist, from the scientist astronaut group at JSC,
was recommended to the Mission Manager and approved by the Program Manager.
A second Scientist Astronaut from JSC was appointed to serve as backup.
The Mission Specialist was responsible administratively to JSC, but
functionally reported directly to the ASSESS II Mission Manager at MSFC.
The role of the Mission Specialist for ASSESS II was established as follows:
- To act as the in-flight alter ego of the Mission Manag,.r and to
	
`	 be generally responsible for coordination and conduct of
combined payload operations during flight
- To be the single interface between the Payload Specialists and
STS flight crew (pilot/copilot)
- To be responsible for all aircraft experiment-support systems
such as power distribution, central data system, etc.
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it- Upon approval of the NASA Program Manager, to be trained to act
as a Payload Specialist and operate experiments during the
flight mission
- To work with the POCC, MCC, Payload Specialists, and Flight
Commander (Pilot) to solve in-flight problems caused by
equipment failures and/or flight conditions leading to
changes of science priorities
3.4.5 Payload Specialists (PJS)
NASA selected two P/Ss from JPL. Thirty-three P/S nominations were
submitted, 31 of them from JPL. To reduce training and travel costs, NASA
E	 assigned the Assistant Mission Manager from MSFC as tae single backup P/S,
who thus served a dual role and dividel his time between mission m.&iagement
activities and P/S training. ESA selected four P/Ss: one from the University
of Southampton, one from the ESA Space Science Department, and two from DFVLR.
A dozen candidates applied. The ESA plan was to appoint two as prime P/Ss
and two as backup. In reality, ESA decided, with NASA Program Manager
concurrence, to change one of the P/Ss during the mission flight period so
that three of the ESA P/Ss participated as payload flight crew members.
' »
	
	 The Payload bpecialists reported administratively to JPL and ESA
respectively. Prior to arrival at Ames, they reported managerially to
the MSFC Mission Manager and to the ESA Payload Manager respectively.
After arrival at Ames, they were integrated into the mission management
team. In addition to their flight role, they actively participated in
the ground operation and test phase.
3.5 Flight Payload
Experiments selected for the ASSESS II payload are given in the
table on the next page.
Some elements of the payload were considered to be experiment support
devices analogous to Spacelab experiment support systems to be operated by
the STS organization. These included aircraft provided systems such as
the experiment power distribution system, the ADDAS data handling system,
a water vapor overburden radiometer, and two gyrostabilized mirrors.
v
Most equipment was mounted in or on standard CV-990 equipment racks.
Experiment control functions, except for the IR telescope, were centralized
in five Spacelab-like racks which were grouped in the forward area of the
Q = .	 aircraft for operation by the Payload Specialists. Figure 3 shows the
'`	 payload in the aircraft including these control racks.
EXPERIMENTS FOR ASSESS II MISSIGN
University of Southampton,
England
NASA Experiments
NASA/JPL
NASA/JPL
INSTRUMENTATION
30-cm open port telescope
with TV tracking. IR
Photometer and Fabry-
Perot Tilting Filter
Speci^rometer
Imege intensified
integrating TV camera-
near IR
LIDAR (Light Emitting
Detection and Ranr,Ing)
-1 um
Physiological sensors
Michelson Interferometer
-sub mm
EMI measuring equipment
Two synthetic aperture
radars - X band and L
band
Microwave limb sounder
-167 GHz
MEASUREMENT
IR line spectroscopy
and
IR galactic cold cloud
temperatures
OH Airglow -;lave
structure
Concentration of
scattering aerosols
in atmosphere
P/S med 4 .cal reaction
to time and stress
changes
Chromospheric
temperature
EMI characteristics
of aircraft systems
and payload
Radar terrain mapL
for earth resources
feajibility study
Spectral lines of
trace gases in
atmosphere
Atuvispheric ozone
concentration
Atmospheric ozone
concentration
Monitoring of
selected communication
band usage
ORGANIZATION
ESA Experiments
Observatoiie de Paris, Meudon
France; Max Planck Institut,
Garching, Germany;University
of Groningen, Netherlands
DFVLR-Oberpfaffenhofen,
Institut L Physik der
Atmosphare, Germany
DFVLR-Bad Godesberg,
Institut f. Flugmedizin,
Germany, and NASA/Ames
Observatorio de Capodimonte/
Instituta de Physica,
Firenze, Italy
ESA/ESTEC
NASA/JP'.	 Laser Absorption
Spectrometer •10.6 }gym
NASt.,'[.aRC	 Infrared heterodyne
radiometer -10.6 um
NASA/GSFC	 Swept and fixed band
radio receiver.i
VHF & UHF
8
^I
P,
A
L. .
Figure 3. Payload with Spacelab-rype Racks in CV-990 Aircraft
9
4. MISSION IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 General
Figure 4, on page 11, shows the overall project schedule. Experiment
preparation, integration planning, Payload and Mission Specialist selection
and training at PI facilities, flight plannin,, and other associated
activities took place over the first 10 months leading to integration
of the European experiments at ESA/SPICE in Germany beginning in January
1977. System Level Payload Integration at ARC started in March, and
required about a month. Launch Site Payload Processing on the aircraft
also required a month, and ended in mid-May. The simulated Spacelab
flight began on May 16, 1977, 14 months after final project approval.
4.2 Experiment Selection and Funding
European experiments were selected by ESA in April 1976, following
an Announcement of Opportunity. Funding of these experiments was handled
on a national basis with ESA adding necessary funds to support the activities
peculiar to the ASSESS II Spacelab simulation.
NASA/OA decided initially to select experiments from their ongoing
experiment program, and a baseline group comprised of five experiments
was approved in May 1976. Because of shortness of time, OA emphasized the
selection of experiment prototypes destined for the Spacelab era that
had previously flown on the CV-990 aircraft. It was also recognized that
one or two experiments might have to be dropped from the baseline because
of development or funding problems. Iterations within NASA/OA delayed
full solidification of the NASA payload for several months. Funding was
finally distributed in December 1977, except for one experiment (from
GSFC) which, because of special approval requirements, was not authorized
and funded until February 4, 1977, the last day Program Management agreed
to accept the experiment with any chance of success.
4.3 Investigator Requirements Document (IRD)
The IRD form was prepared by the MSFC Mission Management staff with
a plan to cover, in a single document, all experiment interfaces for the
project from hardware and data interactions through POCC and flight
requirements. One IRD form was sent from MSFC to each experimenter,
followed by visits of system engineers from ESA and NASA to each experimenter
in June and November, 1976. During these visits, the PIs were aEsisted
in filling in the requested information by the visiting engineers. At
the close of these visits, the IRDs had been filled in to the extent
possible at that time. No further effort was made to complete the IRDs
afe-r November 1976. Open items still remaining following the second
rolmd of visits were individually har ped directly between the Pis and
cognizant project management personnel.
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4.4 Analytical Integration
Two formal analytical integration efforts were conducted at MSFC
in July and December, 1976, utilizing information from the IRDs. The
first session was organized into three basic groups to address Giound
Operations, Flight Operations, and Payload Configuration. Many details
were not available at that time, which permitted only gross planning in
several areas. The initial look at flight operations did establish that
it was possible to meet nearly all experiment objectives.
The second analytical integration at MSFC updated flight plans,
arrangements for the POCK, and the aircraft configuration. Continuing
changes in experiment configuration and coordination of data interfaces
were handled by telephone a:zd letter directly with ARC. Flight planning
was iterated among MSFC, JSC, and ARC throughout the pre-flight period.
4.5 Investigator Working Group Activities
Two meetings of the Investigator Working Group (IWG) were convened
immediately following each formal analytical integration activity in July
and December, 1976. The IWG identified complementary science objectives
and negotiated science scheduling and target allocations for flight
planning. Analytical engineering results, mission plans, and schedules
were presented to the IWG for discussion and iteration. The IWG also
made recommendations regarding P/S selection.
4.6 Payload Specialist/Mission Specialist Selection and Training Activities
European P/S candidates were submitted by the participating PI organi-
zations, DFVLR, and ESA. Screening tests were conducted on candidates for
ESA by the DFVLR Institute of Aviation Medicine and the Lufthansa Medical
Office for Flight Personnel. These tests were based on criteria for airline
flight engineers. Using the results, ESA management, with recommendation
from the European IWG members, selected four P/Ss to participate in
ASSESS Il--two to be later designated as prime, and two as backup.
In the U.S., the single P/S nominations from GSFC and LaRC were
withdrawn, leaving 31 from JPL, wheie laboratory-wide advertisement had
been conducted. JPL narrowed their nominations to two candidates who
me* the payload operator requriements issued by MSFC. The Assistant
Mission 11unager from MSFC was designated to serve as the sole backup
P/S for U.S. experiments to save training and travel costs. These
three were accepted by the IWG and mission management.
P/S training generally consisted of about one week of classroom-type
training with each PI plus an additional two weeks of hands-on training
with the experiment equipment at the PI laboratory. For secondary experiment
assignments, they received only about one week of hands-on training at the
it laboratory. This hands-on training varied, since the schedule uf single
visits to the PI laboratories found the experimenter equipment in widely
varying degrees of completion. The M/S did not visit the PI laboratories,
but he did observe and train on aircraft experiment support systems on
earlier CV-990 flights. Also, the U.S. P/Ss and the M/S participated in
some of the analytical integration process at MSFC.
"	 12
Further valuable training occurred during P/S and M/S participation
t in the payload integration process.	 The ESA P/Ss and the M/S (pact-time)
! participated at SPICE in Europe in the ESA/SPICE integration and
simulated mission operation of the European installed instruments. 	 All
P/Ss and the M/S participated (both interface and payload operation) in
System Level Payload Integration and Launch Site Payload Processing at
ARC.	 During this period, the NASA P/Ss received their training on the
medical equipment.
T4'-_ 4.7
	 Integration of ESA Payload in Europe
ESA brought all European experiments together at ESA/SPICE
(Porz-Wahn, Germany) for centralized integration of their portion of
the payload.	 Activities at this centralized site during the period from
January 15 to March 15, 1977, included:
- Completion of experiment development and integration
- ESA acceptance testing
- EMI characterization and corrective action where necessary
- Flightworthiness verification
- Development and integration of experiment software
- Experiment integration on system level
_
- Interexperiment compatibility testing
- Mission Simulations
- Training of flight and ground support personnel
As part of the ESA integration activities, a CV-990 mockup was
constructed (Fig. 5) with DFVLR support. Features of this mockup
included flight crew living quarters and power and data handling
support systems. In addition, a remote POCC was provided.
The integration activities were performed under ESA management by
PI teams and the P/Ss, supported by DFVLR technicians.	 Further support
was provided by an ARC safety engineer and a contract data processing
engineer.
	 ESA management involved in this integration were also very
active in the later phases of the project at ARC.
	 Experiment hardware
was upgraded where necessary to meet flight standards, European payload
level P/S training was completed, and operational timelines and procedures
were exercised and consolidated.
	 In addition, the interaction between
the payload flight crew and the PIs on the "ground" was developed and
practiced during simulated flights.
r~
4.8	 System Level Payload Integration (Level IV Integration)
System Level Payload Integration was the initial payload activity
at ARC and accomplished total hardware and software integration with the
'- "Spacelab" interface elements.
	 This was the first time the entire payload
came together.	 Both NASA and ESA provided compatibility and mission
simulation testing and payload crew integrated training.
	 The integration
was performed using a combined NASA/ESA checkout team under the direction
of the MSFC Ground Operations Manager with full participation of the PIs
along with the P/Ss and the M/S.
	 This approach was analogous to the MSFC plan
for system level payload integration of the Spacelab I payload.
13
System Level Payload Integration was performed on the hangar floor
(independent from the aircraft) using a Payload Checkout Unit (PCU) to
simulate the onboard interfaces with experiments. Figure 6 shows a
photograph of the integration layout. The experiments and associated
cabling were arranged approximately like the planned flight configuration.
The PCU fed simulated carrier housekeeping signals to the experiments and
also interfaced data outputs planned for data handling on the aircraft.
	
`	 Principal activities included:
- Experiment preparation by the experimenter
	
_	 - Physical/electrical integration with the PCU
- Experiment checkouts, calibrations, alignments,
and software verification
- Experiment/PCU functional and compatibility tests
- A Simulated Mission Sequence Test
- Flightworthiness verification
Prior to experiment connection to the PCU for initiation of checkout,
each PI listed his instrument status with identification of all known
problems.
U. S. experiments were sequentially integrated upon delivery during
a 10-day period. European experiments, which had been through an integration
and operation sequence at ESA/SPICE, were delivered together and were
integrated as a group within a short period (4 days). Combined NASA and
ESA experiment integration and testing required an additionl 13-g weeks.
Experimenters and their staffs, along with the P/Ss and ARC technicians,
performed hardware and cable installation of the experiments. Integration
activities were conducted using MSFC system checkout procedures which
incorporated individual PI generated experiment test sequences. MSFC
imposed a uniform work control system for all integration activities of
the payload checkout team which had the following features: identification
of problems, authorization and scheduling of all test and problem solving
activities, certification of all tests and problem corrections, and a
complete log of open and closed items. After an experiment was integrated
with the PCU, the PI worked on his experiment as required using the work
control system. The PIs were requested to keep a log book to record
activities and changes in their hardware.
The schedule was closely tracked using daily meetings to identify
open items and to schedule all activities. Single shift operation was
planned, but extensive calibrations (not previously requested by the PIs
for system integration) combined with experiment and data interface
problems, necessitated daily overtime and weekend operations.
At the end of this integration task, MSFC, supported by each
experimenter and ESA management, certified the payload to KSC with
identification of equipment status and all open items.
14
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4.9 Launch Site Payload Processing (Level III/II/I Integration)
Launch Site Payload Processing was managed by KSC and involved
installation and checkout of the payload in the aircraft, preparatory
for flight. Activities included: experiment installation,
experiment/aircraft interface verification, experiment testing and
calibration, compatibility test, mission sequence test, an all-up
Integrated Mission Simulation, and final preparation for launch. The
entire process was completed during a four-week period by a team composed
of KSC, ARC, MSFC, the M/S, P/Ss, and experimenter personnel.
}	 Experiment installation was completed during the first two weeks and
!.r	 involved a number of changes due to incomplete analytical integration
information and several changes in PI requirements. These changes were for
t	 increased testing and calibration on board the aircraft which were beyond the
3	 requirements initially identified in the IRDs, and they were approved to
maximize the science return. A single-shift schedule, similar to the Level IV
integration plan, was planned for launch site processing, but daily and weekend
overtime work was required to maintain the schedule and meet the flight date.
Significant features of the activity on board the aircraft were the
considerable amount of experimental testing found to be necessary to insure
achievement of payload objectives and the large number of hardware and
software problems encountered during experiment operations.
;U1 onboard activities were conducted under a uniform work control
system in tditch all tasks were planned, scheduled, and documented. The P/Ss
represented the PI and were responsible for experiment integration, testing,
troubleshooting and repair, with the PI being called in when necessary. The
responsibility for any work internal to an experiment remained with the
experimenter. A formal stowage list was prepared, including a flight data
file, tools, test equipment, materials, and spare parts. All items were
placed aboard the aircraft similar to preparation for space flight.
An Integrated Mission Simulation was carried out on May 5 and 6 as
a final checkout and training exercise. This was a full-up dress rehearsal
covering a continuous 31-hour period and involved the payload crew (in
confinement), the PIs, the MCC/POCC staffs, and managen.snt personnel.
At the coc.pletioh of launch site processing, a Flight Readiness Review
was held at which KSC certified to the Mission Manager that all payload
requirements had been completed ready for launch.
4.10 Mission Control Center and Payload Operations Control Center (MCC and POCC)
An MCC was established at Ames and was operated by JSC, with support
`	 from ARC, to manage aircraft flight operations. An MCC Flight Operations
Director from JSC was in charge of flight planning activity and real-time
communications with the aircraft flight crew relative to implementation of
the flight plans or any changes dictated by flight constraints of payload
requirements. The MCC and its operation were a very abbreviated
representation of that planned at JSC for the more complex arrangement
for interaction with Shuttle.
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The POCC at Ames was organized and operated by MSFC is a manner
similar to their plans for Spacelab 1. They staffed the PCCC with a
Payload Operations Director, a Payload Activity Planner, and an operations
Coordinator, along with the Mission Scientist and a representative from
`	 each experiment. Voice communications were provided to maintain contact
throughout the flight mission asioig all elements of the POCC. with the
payload crew, and the MCC. The only additional communication links were
a video downlink and a text uplink similar to the system planned for early
Spacelab flights and operated by the MCC. in the POCC, the Mission
Scientist coordinated the PI science requirements and science communications
with POCC management and the payload flight crew. Additional separate
facilities were provided close to the POCC operations area for PI conferences
and data analysis.
POCC operations consisted of:
- Updated payload Planning on a daily basis
- Briefing of the payload flight crew for each day's activities
- Communications with the payload crew to address problem areas
and coordinate decisions with the payload crew
- Daily operations debriefing
- Quick-look scientific data analysis by the ?Is
. 9
4.11 Conduct of the Flight Mission
z
	
	
Nine aircraft flights (data-take periods), totaling 53 flight hours
in nine successive days, were carried out to represent a single Spacelab
mission. The M/S and four P/Ss were fully confined to the aircraft and
living quarters throughout the entire period. Preestablished timelines
for P/S preparation and operation of experiments were used as baselines
for pre-data-take periods and data-taking operat:.oas of the payload.
Daily briefings and debriefings were conducted before and after data-take
periods from the MCC for flight operations and from the POCC for payload
operations. As the flight proceeded, payload problems and flight
conditions necessitated real time changes from the preplanned experiment
objectives tracks and changes of plans for given experiment observation
periods. Communication was possible with the paylaod crew during data-take
as well as the ground based periods. Communication was generally poor
over the HF radio system during aircraft flights. The M/S coordinated
communications to and from the payload crew. Communication blackout
periods were scheduled into the overall timeline to represent Spacelab
communications blackout periods.
Generally most experiments produced good data, but many real-time
problems occurred and were addressed by onboard and ground based
personnel, which resulted in varying degrees of correction and several
alterations of flight plans. Approximate flight data-take time and the
major problems for each experiment were as follows:
ty
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IR Astronomy - 45 hours 	 - Misalignment of optics caused large
offset signal - P/S minimized at
expense of sensitivity, but did
not eliminate.
- Pump failure - P/S timeshared pump
from another experiment and
later repaired it.
- Computer program problems (occasional).
P/S switched to manual mode.
Airglow - 35 hours
	
- One camera out of alignment
electronically. P/S attempted
adjustment at length without
success.
- Tape recorder jammed - P/S oiled
part and restarted.
IHR - 46 hours
	
- Reference channel weak throughout
mission. Not fixed - degraded data.
- Optics left in wrong position for one
data-take period. Finally reset
(10% data time lost).
LAS - 46 hours	 - Low sensitivity throughout mission.
P/S realigned and effected some
improvement.
LIDAR - 46 hours	 - Blown fuse prevented signal detection.
Data lost for one data-take period.
P/S replaced fuse. (10% data time
lost). Data link to ADDAS occasionally
malfunctioned. Corrective procedure
employed by P/S.
Medical - 53 hours	 - One of the tape recorders failed -
(data also taken throughout	 P/S replaced it with onboard spare -
non-flight periods) 	 little data loss.
-	 i
a_
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SAR - 41 hours	 - Inoperative optical recorders (2)
(basic grounding problem) - lost all
data first four data-take periods.
Experiment declared failure for the
mission. PI than fixed the recorders
(outside mission constraints) for
last five data-take periods (45%
data time lost).
AELS - 53 hours	 - Persistent EMI throughout mission on
one receiver - P/S could not identify
fix. PI fixed after constrained
mission. Noise generator failed
occasionally - reduced calibration
accuracy. (P/S restored operation).
Secondary chart recorder failed -
reconnected to spare channels of
M.S recorder.
MLS - 46 hours	 - Automatic mode chosen by PI for P/S
operation caused low signal output.
PI recognized problem - P/S not asked
to change made as he was not trained
in manual mode. PI improved after
constrained mission.
Capodimonte - 46 hours	 - Amplifier failed - P/S replaced with
spare. Operated with degraded
data for one data :ake period.
EMI - 53 hours	 - Loose electrical connector. Fixed by
non-flight personnel after first
data-take period. No data lost.
4.12 Use of Central Data System
Eight of the ten instruments were designed to interface with the central
data handling system (ADDAS).
The experiment/ ADDAS interface data handling Sophistication varied
from simple use of ADDAS only to obtain housekeeping data (which was
recorded by ADDAS for the entire mission), to onboard interaction with
ADDAS for experiment calibration, and, in some cases, limited data
reduction using the ADDAS system. Some experiments had their own
microprocessors. Three experiments had flown before on the CV-990. so
that their data system interfacing problems were reduced.
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Two of the ESA experiments encountered significant problems in interfacing
and operating with the ADDAS system. One problem was due to a complex timing
inconsistency which, in fact, was not.completely solved until the third
data-take period. The other problem was due to an experiment hardware
interface design incompatibility that required inordinate effort through
experiment testing, Level IV integration, and launch site processing, but
was fully solved just before flight. Both experiments correctly functioned
after problem resolution, and no significant degradation in science return
was experienced.
Both experiment software development and integration were, in general,
performed by specialized ADDAS data system engineers working very closely
with PIs for definition of requirements and experiment interfaces.
Data tapes from ADDAS plus some selected records directly from experiments
were carried off the aircraft daily to simulate the Spacelab payload data downlink.
Limited processing facilities were provided in conjunction with the PCCC, along
with some PI furnished data processing equipment, to permit the PI to evaluate
the condition of the experiment and request any changes in flight plan or
experiment operation resulting from quick-look results.
4.13 Documentation
A special objective of the ASSESS II mission was to simplify procedures
and minimize the amount of paper work necessary to accomplish the mission,
consistent with plans for Spacelab. These criteria led to significant
discussion in the Mission Steering Group and a Baseline Documentation and
Information Flow for ASSESS II issued by the MSG about 10 months before
flight. That plan is shown in Figure 7.
The actual documents issued by the various participants and used in the
mission are given below. Top level inter-agency agreements between NASA and
ESA Headquarters documents are not included since they were ASSESS unique and
not applicable to Spacelab. Also, the ESA documentation used for the ESA
payload integration and checkout in Europe is not included. The documentation
is divided into three classes as follows:
CLASS A Reference documents - not mission unique
CLASS B Mission management documents - interfacing documents
which would be reissued for each mission
CLASS C Mission implementation documents - internal working
documents within a given organization
MSFC Documents
CLASS A)
- POCC Requirements
- POCC Operations Handbook
- POCC Operations Implementation Procedures
- Ground Operations Reference Document
21
I1
^
a&
I
U
Jc
l
^
^
Q W a
 
Q
lw—:
_N
m
=
 
m
=
 
w
 M M= M= M= w= M= M
WQ
V Z
L
L
 Q
^
ZO
a0J m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
HHWEOw30c0LJwGGc4JLJEOCJCUv:x^JL6
CAN
Y/Y
Na
ii
i
i
i
CLASS B)
- Investigator Requirements Documents (one per experisent)
- Payload Level IV and Launch Site Ground Operations
Requirements Document
- Payload Flight Definition Requirements Document
- Payload Operator requirements and Preliminary
Training Plan
- Payload Specialists Training Implementation Document
- Level IV Integration Implementation Document
- Payload Mission Rules
- Payload Configuration Drawing
- Experiment Installation Sketches (Mechanical)
- Experiment Installation Cable Interconnect
CLASS C)
- Data Requirements Document
- Payload Flight Data File
- Detailed Payload Crew Activity Plans
- Payload Stowage List
Level IV Detailed Documents
r
- Investigator Log (oue per experiment)
- Diagrams and Procedures
- Payload Procedures
- Problem Reports
- Test Preparation Sheets
- Discrepancy Report Tags
POCC Documentation for each Flight
- Director's Log
- Payload Planner's Log
Communicator's Log
=
Final Flight Plans
Science Plan Chart
POCC Operations Timeline
- Payload Crew Timelines
- Data Slice Requests (one per experiment as required)
- Data Terminal Time Assignment
Record of Data Offloaded from Aircraft
- As Flown Data Logs (postflight)
- Science Summary Report (postflight)
t
L
KSC Documents
`	 CLASS A)
- Launch Site Integration Implementation Plan (Part A)
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CLASS B)
- 
Launch Site Integration Implementation Plan (Part B)
- Operation and Malatenance Instruction
CLASS C)
- Problem Report
- Discrepancy Report Tag
- Engineering Change Notice
- Launch Site Requirements Change Notice
- Test Preparation Sheet
JSC Documents
CLASS A)
- STS Rules
- MCC Console Handbook
CLASS B)
- Mission Implementation Plan
- Integrated Summary Crew Activity Plan
- CV-990 Daily Might Plans
- Flight Support Work Schedules
- Integrated Mission Simulation Plan
- Data Retrieval Log
CLASS C)
- MCC Console Log
5. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS FOR SPACELAB
5.1 Introduction
The ASSESS II mission was very successful as a simulation of Spacelab
interfaces and activities. Management interfaces were exercised among
experimenters and the ESA and NASA organizations to be tnvolved in Spacelab.
The gamut of activities to bring experimenters througL development,
integration into a payload, and through flight operation and data retrieval
with active PI participation and an operating POCC and MCC was thoroughly
experienced. An M/S and Y/Ss were selected and trained, and performed
satisfactorily in flight. The entire exercise was regarded by all
participants as excellent and valuable training for future Spacelab
operations. Some anticipated Spacelab activities were exercised extensively;
others less so due mainly to funding limitations, particularly in the U.S.,
and aircraft system constraints. Also, it is important to point out that
all parties were working to extremely tight schedules that forced some
preliminary work to be done in parallel and some data to be late. No one
had the option of adding additional manpower or funding to overcome the data
and schedule problems.
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It is not the purpose of this report to address scientific results,
but a very general evaluation of the quality and quantity of scientific
data is given for completeness. The data obtained from the experiments
was of satisfactory quality in the majority of cases, and the ratio of
data achieved to data expected was also good. The fact that the payload
was interdisciplinary dictated that flight periods had to be prioritizedj	 because flight conditions were not conducive to data retrieval from all
experiments at the same time. A first look at the results is summarized
below:
LIDAR (Germany) - Good quality data in majority of the data periods.
IRA (France, Germany, The Netherlands) - New maps of several prime sources
with good data on main targets.
LAS (U.S.) - Ozone detections were made only near end of mission.
IRR (U.S.) - Data not yet evaluated, but appears satisfactory.
AIRGLOW (England) - Good looking sky pictures for most data periods.
MLS (U.S.) - Data in all data periods, but sensitivity very low.
AEES (U.S.) - Data during all data periods, but partly masked by
frequent electromagnetic interference in some receiver frequencies.
SAR (U.S.) - Ground mapping with L-band system during later data periods
after PI was allowed to violate simulation rules and correct a
critical physical integration error.
CAPO (Italy) - Solar and atmospheric data satisfactorily taken during
'	 most of data periods.
MEDICAL - (Germany) - Excellent data throughout mission.
EMI (ESA) - An engineering experiment that identified good approaches to
eliminate or ree.-,ce EMI and also proved extremely valuable as
troubleshooting apparatus.
The follow. -g conclusions for Spacelab were synthesized from the
project and are i _lowed % q each case by a brief analysis.
5.2 Payload Selection and Fun^^ng
5.2.1 Payload Selection
Compatibility of payload scientific discipline requirements simplifies
payload planning and mission implementation.
For ASSESS II, a variety of s--.ientific objectives required a wide
variety of targets and tines of observation, involving both day and night
observation perioO,. With this mix of L. .periments, there was no possibility
of operating all experiments efficiently at all times. Flight planning was
seriously complicated by the mix of objectives, and experiment operations
were necessarily compromised. Although or Spacel pb it may be necessary
in many cases to carry interdisciplinary payload , similar scientific
objectives will permit more simplified flight pianning, increase efficiency
of experiment operations, reduce scope of crew training, and should be
expected to yield more usable data for an overall mission.
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(b) Payload complement can be formed by selecting from ongoing experiment
development programs or existing instrumentation.
OA avoided the use of an Announcement of Opportunity for generating
its payload complement for ASSESS II because of the limited time available
and lack of funding to support proposals. Instead, in June 1976, OA
identified payload candidates among various disciplines that were planned
for future Spacelab missions and for which early prototype tests were
being conducted with the CV-990. The five OA experiments flown on ASSESS II
were selected by this method. In view of planned Spacelab/Shuttle launch
rates in the mid 1980s, this selection method could be used with "discipline"
Announcements of Opportunity used to secure proposals without regard to a
specific mission (e.g., Spacelab I, etc.). Although ESA used an Announcement
of Opportunity, all the experimentF they selected were in some stage of
development, which also supports the conclusion.
5.2.2 Pffload Funding
The following conclusions arise particularly from experience with
the NASA experiments on ASSESS II.
(a) Timely authorization and funding of the payload is mandatory to avoid
serious impact on mission definition and resultant compromise of
scientific return. Analysis of payload funding schedules is of equal
importance to payload analytical integration.
Delay in distribution of funds, and authorization for one U.S.
experiment, delayed configuration, interface definition, data processing
software, and construction of experiment support hardware. These difficulties
were reflected throughout the whole chain of participating organizations.
The resultant extremely tight schedule for the one experiment necessitated
premium time costs, caused equipment failures, and lost scientific data.
(b) Funding deficiencies and multiple funding channels must be avoided to
prevent compromising payload elements.
The selection of five experiments comprising the baseline OA payload
wes made by the NASA HQ OA "discipline" program offices having management
cognizance. Funding for hardware was available for all but one experiment,
but was not adequate for integration and data analysis. Reprogramming from
other funding sources caused delays in getting funds distributed. There
was no central control authority established in NASA Headquarters (and,
therefore, none at the mission management level) to work these problems.
Multiple authorities over funding resulted in on-again-off-again
decisions. One experiment was dropped for lack of funding, only to
reappear later when reprogramming actions were taken.
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Funding allocations should cover all required integration and mission
operations support in addition to hardware development and data anlysis.
Insufficient effort was made to budget for integration and support
activities by experimenters. The analytical integration effort, in
particular, was insufficiently supported, with resultant detriment to
mission planning, integration, and checkout. Several experimenters
were limited by travel fund restrictions to a lower level of personal
support than was necessary to do a minima' proper job.
5.3 Management Relations
The Mission Steering Group (MSG) proved an effective forum for solving
interface problems and exchanging views and philosophies on the conduct
of the mission. ESA suggests that a similar multiorganizational group
be used to oversee all joint Spacelab missions.
The Mission Steering Group was established for ASSESS II specifically
to guide the mission and establish ground rules for the simulation in order
to maximize results for Spacelab. As the mission progressed, the MSG, with
key representatives from all of the participating organizations, became a
forum for addressing basic mission problems. ESA, particularly, believes
such a body would serve a useful purpose in the same manner for Spacelab
missions in which they are involved; NASA feels that such a body conflicts
with its direct management responsibility, particularly the Mission Manager
role, and does not agree that this approach is appropriate or required
for Spacelab.
(b) Mission Manager concept appears sound, but adequate :staffing is essential
and further development of the concept is necessary to insure efficient
coverage of all program aspects.
Implementation of the ASSESS II project under an MSFC Mission Manager
worked well and could be implemented at any organization given responsibility
for a payload. However, the Mission Manager must have adequate resources to
fully organize the payload, identify and track all payload interfaces, conduct
meaningful analytical integration, identify payload requirements to STS, and
plan and staff the POCC during flight operations.
The engineering support provided was not adequate to properly handle
the Investigator Requirements Documents and the analytical integration of
F physical, electrical, and data experiment interfaces. The result substantially
altered an initial objective to implement the procedures proposed for Spacelab,
and caused these areas of effort to be handled on an informal basis between
the experimenters and ARC. However, there is reason to believe that additional
analytical integration effort plus more effort to maintain current understandings
of the experiment interfaces as the mission progresses toward flight would
eliminate these difficulties.
27
The ESA/SPICE Mission Manager served as the single interface to the
MSFC Mission Manager for the European experiments and also managed integration
and operation of the ESA portion of the pa^,load in Europe. KSC representatives
in particular observed that the single interface of the ESA/SPICE Manager
for the European experiments worked very smoothly and efficiently.
(c) Management must clearly inform all participants early in the mission as to
roles and responsibilities.
It is essential that an early, deliberate effort be made by program
and mission management to inform all prime participants as to various roles
and responsibilities and the management paths required to obtain optimal
results, particularly for such complex management arrangements as existed
for ASSESS II and are planned for some Spacelab missions. The STS role, and
its relationship to other implementing centers, was not clearly defined by
NASA Headquarters at the outset of ASSESS II. Interviews with many
participants late in the ASSESS project revealed that they had only
sketchy ideas as to the responsibilities of various organizations and
of their relationships with them.
ASSESS II was an initial trial for the Mission Manager concept for
Spacelab and, in spite of early attempts to inform participants as to
various roles and responsibilities, some modes of operation developed as
the mission progressed. Some Payload Specialists and the Mission Specialist
became involved well after the beginning. The Mission Manager at MSFC was
changed in January 1977 to put all Office of Applications missions into one
office. Continuity of effort and early complete identification of all
participants' responsibilities are required for full understanding and
most effective operation.
(d) Participation by the PIs throughout the mission planning and implementation
phases can enhance overall mission understanding (by both management and
user) and thereby improve science return. PIs must recognize their
leadership position concerning their experiments.
In ASSESS II, each PI and/or his staff participated directly in IRD
activity, IWG meetings, System Level Payload Integration, and the real time
flight operations through the POCC. In addition, access to his equipment
was relatively easy during Launch Site Payload Processing if he had such a
need. The PIs were pleased with their degree of involvement. The only
concerns expressed by them were a lack of feedback from the IRD submittals
so they would know what commitments had been made, and a desire for an
opportunity for greater science exchange during IWG actions.
The degree of responsibility by the PI for integrated tests, P/S
training and operational procedures, and support of all mission operations
with a sufficient and effective PI support team must be realized and
fully supported by the PI.
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5.4 Pre-Flight Planning and Payload Integration
5.4.1 Investigators' Working Group (IWG)
The IWG can be a satisfactory forum for scientific inputs and a valuable
channel for management/PI information flow.
On ASSESS II, the IWG concept was not fully exercised. The IWG met
twice during ASSESS II, but the meetings, especially the second, were not
well attended due mainly to lack of travel funds for Pis. This problem
made transatlantic travel out of the question, and even meetings of the
European half-IWG, or the O.S. half-IWG difficult. Within this severe
constraint, the IWG had the following beneficial results: - Evolution
of a cooperative experiment between two PIs; inputs to Payload Specialist
selection; transfer of information about the aircraft and the data handling
system; and contributions to mission planning. With more extensive use of
the IWG, all of these functions can be better exercised for Spacelab. In
addition, early IWG meetings with management can be used to inform the Pis
of mission plans, and iterate the integration requirements. The IWG, under
charimanship of_the Mission Scientist, can be an effective body for nominating
payload specialits.
The Mission Scientist (and any IWG cochairman or vice-chairman) needs to
have clearly defined responsibilities, full support by the PIs, and be
provided with a management overview.
The Mission Scientist served a key role in planning and execution of
science activity and provided focus of science requirements and science
tradeoffs to the Mission Manager. His effectiveness in performing this role
was variable depending upon the degree to which all other participants
recognized the requirement for his analysis of all science considerations.
He worked with planners for flight operations to present the science case
to mission management. This mode of operation was very effective. During
flight operations, the NASA and ESA Mission Scientists were very successful
in coordinating and managing PI activities. The 'mission Scientist must be
strong in his own right to promote and defend payload needs in the face of
project implementation processes.
5.4.2 Investigator Requirements Document (IRD)
A single requirements document interfacing with each PI is desirable and
feasible.	 Face-to-face discussions with the participation of disciplinary
experts are necessary to clarify interfaces. These discussions must start
early in the mission, and must continue to be iterated to insure proper
information transfer.
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A single document for each experimenter to identify all requirements
was used with limited success on ASSESS II. However, the concept appears
very sound. The question and answer format was good, but the overall
organization of the questions needs very careful study and arrangement to
eliminate redundancy and achieve tadmum clarity with brevity. Initial
attempts to have the PIs fill out the document unilaterally were not
satisfactory. Face-to-face meetings with the experimenters were necessary
to clarify the need for interface information and obtain total understanding.
When experimenters understood the requirements, in every case they very
aggressively worked to produce needed information. The IRD, in most cases,
served very well to focus PI attention on interface areas much earlier than
would otherwise be the case.
Only a very small interfacing group (perhaps 3 or b) is needed to
deal with each experimenter, but it-is absolutely mandatory that experts
who fully know the Spacelab systems (electrical, mechanical, data system,
etc.) work with the experimenters. The IRD mist be a living document since
much of the information will develop with time and the resultant document
forms the basic source of experimenter input for integration and flight
operations.
In ASSESS II, the IRD effort started well, even though the format
needed much improvement, but the initial effort about a year before flight
left many unanswered questions. After a second effort by MSFC and the PIs
to complete all elements of the IRD, schedule pressure and unavailability
of manpower necessitated gathering the balance of the required interface
t	 information on an informal basis. However, even with the limited application
of the IRD on ASSESS II, there is general agreement that the basic concept
is sound.
(b) The IRDs must be kept current so that they properly reflect changes in
experiments as they are developed, but there must be a cut-off date beyond
which all aspects of the experiments are fixed.
During ASSESS II, most experiments delivered to ARC for system
payload integration had at least some configuration change from that
worked out with the PI during the IRD baselining activity. Sbme PIs
had added components, others had removed components, and some had changed
component positions. This necessitated juggling hardware arrangements
and recalculation of weights and overturning moments to insure safety.
For the aircraft program extra effort permitted satisfactory recovery,
but for Spacelab not only will the payload configuration have to be
tracked closely, but the much larger number of components for many
!	 Spacelab experiments, coupled with the severe schedule and cost restrictions
to handle many configuration changes, dictates a need to freeze the
experiment configurations at an appropriate time.
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(a) The analytical integration of a Spacelab payload must be accomplished in
a timely, complete fashion so that all participants can receive complete
payload definition and requirements early enough to plan the payload
processing activities.
In ASSESS II, since the formal analytical integration effort was not
fully completed, extensive real time effort was required by ARC to work with
the PI and solidify final physical, electrical, and data interfaces. Hardware
installation sketches were used by KSC in lieu of formal documentation. As a
culmination of the compressed mission schedule, manpower, and late PI test
requirements input, the final Launch Site Integration Requirements were
delivered to KSC one week before statt of Launch Site Payload Processing. As
In several other activities, this allowed little time for review, and several
changes were required to bring the payload to flight readiness.
5.4.4 Integration of BSA Payload in Europe
For Spacelab payloads involving ESA experiments, testing, integration, and
operation of those experiments under ESA management at a centralized
European site is extremely beneficial.
The ESA sponsored integration, test, and operational activity at
ESA/SPICE was extremely beneficial. In most cases, the experimenters needed
deep support to get their equipment assembled and working properly. Individual
assistance was supplied and many problems were identified and solved during
the ESA/SPICE integration and operational activity. With support of a NASA
safety representative, all safety issues were addressed, thus avoiding major
difficulty later. Valuable training was accomplished. The ESA integration
activity insured that die ESA complement arrived in the U.S. as a tested
set of experiments, thus reducing their integration time with the balance
of the payload.
5.4.5 System Level Payload Integration (Level IV)
The value of off-line System Level Payload Integration activities (Level IV)
is directly related to the fidelity of the test facility and the completeness
of the tests performed.
For ASSESS II, the off-line System Level Payload Integration activity
(Level IV) was performed on the hangar floor. It was a minimum cost
arrangement. This first-time integration of the entire payload uncovered
many problems--most were solved and some were passed on to launch site
processing where those plus many additional problems were addressed.
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The ability to address all problems in an off-line system simulator is strongly
proportional to the investement in simulator equipment to achieve high fidelity.
Without the exact cabling configuration (both data and power) and duplicates of
the flight support system, the most troublesome EMI type of problems cannot be
identified.
Off-line System Level Payload Integration activities (Level IV) are very
effective in crew training.
For ASSESS II, although the ESA P/Ss had participated and trained during
the ESA integration activity, the off-line System Level Payload Integration and
operation at ARC was the first time all P/Ss had an opportunity to operate
experiments as a complete payload. The P/Ss were given basic responsibilities
during this phase, side by side with the experimenters, who also participated
directly in this ;'lase of integration. This was excellent training for the P/Ss,
and it is highly recommended that P/Ss be given this same opportunity and
assignment for Spacelab.
5.4.6 Launch Site Payload Processing (Levels III, II, I)
For launch site integration, timely detailed technical definition of
payload carrier interfaces is essential.
The Launch Site Ground operations Requirements Document was delivered to
KSC one week before start of Launch Site Payload Processing. Several payload
interfaces were not completely defined. As a result, KSC had essentially no
lead time to prepare for their work. Although present Spacelab guidelines
limit KSC responsibility to interface verification, some severe experiment
problems occurred which had to be addressed. For the Capodimonte experiment,
one undefined signal interface had to be revised. An incorrect power
connection on the SAR caused complete failure of the experiment from a
Spacelab point of view, and was fixed during flight operations by permitting
the PI to break the simulation rules and go aboard the aircraft to solve the
problem.
Effective launch site payload processing can be performed using a single
direct payload manager interface to the KSC payload processing management.
A payload test team approach, using the M/S, P/Ss,and PIs when necessary,
under the Jurisdiction of KSC to directly support and participate in the
KSC launch site processing operations was very successful and Is recommended
for Spacelab.
For ASSESS II, the KSC launch site Manager, the MSFC Ground Operations
Manager, who had handled the Level IV Integration, and the ESA Payload Manager
worked closely together as a team, utilizing the M/S and the P/Ss full time.
The Mission Manager was the single basic interface with KSC for the payload.
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Although KSC maintained strict control of the schedule and operation, they
were very receptive to participation by the experimenters to handle experiment
problems, rather than creating procedures for use by others. This team
approach is recommended for Spacelab integration at KSC.
To minimize experiment systems failure, time should be scheduled to conduct
experiment functional tests on the integrated vehicle. Failure to perform
these tests implies,at least on priority experiments, technical risk that
may not be commensurate with mission investment.
There is no fully satisfactory substitute for test of the payload
components in the actual flight configuration. While a high-fidelity
off-line test device does allow very significant debugging of the system
interfaces and the payload experiments, there will always be at least
minor configuration variations from the flight system that can produce
serious anomalies in payload operation. In ASSESS II, each experiment
was checked out on the aircraft after final integration. 1. number of
problems were found and solved. For Spacelab, the KSC integration is
baselined only to insure interface and EMI compatibility. It is
recommended that a full operational check of at least priority experiments
be included to insure proper data producing capability.
,Past experience should be applied to insure that experiment tests are
conducted that will indicate possible experiment hardware weaknesses
, or susceptibilities.
A great deal of experience exists at both NASA and ESA Centers
for checkout of experiments to be flown in space. The participation of
the implementation Centers in the design review and test planning phases
of the experiments can assist the PI's rate of success through experience
transfer. The ground rule now being considered for Spacelab puts prime
responsibility upon the PI to insure satisfactory operation of his experiment
while the STS responsibility is limited to safety and interface compatibility.
For ASSESS II, at the discretion of the experimenters, experiments were
not thoroughly tested in all cases before flight. One prim experiment
failed; others had operational problems. A positive approach to marry the
knowledge of experienced personnel with the experimenters' responsibility
to perform critical experiment tests is recommended.
► t
y_
(c)
33
(e) An all-up Integrated Mission Simulation is valuable and is recommended, at
(least for the early Spacelab missions. Inclusion of instrument operation
Ito verify operational interfaces during the simulation enhances the probability
of experiment success.
yi
(f)
(a)
A generally effective end-to-end Integrated Mission Simulation was
conducted in ASSESS II with the payload flight crew carrying out experiment
operation supported by full MCC/POCC participation. Many problems were
identified, some with hardware, and some with operations. This level of
simulation offers the greatest possible degree of training for the total
operations team (MCC, POCC, and payload crew), and should be included
during the final integration period for Spacelab, especially for early
missions.
Facilities and dssociated equipment along with some schedule time should be
made available at the launch site to allow for some experiment testing, solve
last minute experiment problems, and allow for calibration requirements.
Experience has sham that some experiment problems will show up at
KSC when the payload is integrated with the actual flight system. Also,
some experiment calibrations must be performed with the flight system
hardware to obtain acceptable flight data. Both of these cases were
evident in ASSESS II.
Most hardware problems can be quickly and effectively solved at the
launch site, but some electrical and job shop capability close at hand is
necessary along with simple procedures to use this capability. Airborne
payload integration at Ames has been highly successful, particularly
because of these strong capabilities. They were extensively used for
ASSESS II and are recommended for KSC.
5.4.7 Safety
Safety considerations for ASSESS I1 were applied with a low level of
formality, but the experience did not contribute materially to understanding
the required lc ,+el of detail necessary for Spacelab.
Safety considerations for the basic aircraft system and the payloads
at Ames were handled by the Airworthiness Assurance Office. General safety
inspections were handled on a daily basis during integration and ground
operations by the Inspection Branch with simple squawk sheets which
incorporate provision for signoff on the same sheet upon corrective action.
Final all-up mission safety approval is issued in writing by the
Airworthiness and Flight Review Safety Board after formal meeting(@) with
review of all safety related items and operational procedures. All flight
personnel are required to participate in safety briefings. The Aircraft
Commander is the final safety authority during flight. Many safety
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(a)
considerations for Spacelab were not required for ASSESS II; e.g., outgassing,
flammability, stress corrosion, and detailed hazard analyses.
5.5 Payload Flight Crew
The M/S role in ASSESS II and the management arrangement was very successful
and is recommended for Spacelab.
After much controversy and delay, the arrangement for a Scientist
Astronaut to serve as M/S for ASSESS II was worked out. There is no evidence
that this arrangement would not work equally well for Spacelab. The M/S
remained administratively under JSC, but was assigned functionally to the
Mission Manager at MSFC. In addition to his ground based duties, he served
on the flights as the alter ego of the Mission Manager. As the mission
progressed, it became apparent to everyone that he operated very effectively
as leader of the P /Ss, which came about naturally based on his background,
t ^_	 training experience, and personality. The P /Ss were all well satisfied
with this arrangement.
(b) The M/S functions for ASSESS II were unique to that position and served a
vital need.
On ASSESS II, a prime function of the M/S was to bridge the gap
between the experiments and the payload support systems (central data
system, power supply and distribution system, and some special payload
support devices such as gyrostabilized mirrors and a water vapor
radiometer). Long term training is required to handle such systems,
especially the data system, and, in fact, the six-month period for
training for the ASSESS II M/S was wholly insufficient for him to
totally handle the data system (a ghost operator was used). In addition
to this basic function, it was natural for him to serve as the communications
and operations coordinator during flight to maintain ground contact primarily
because the aircraft had a single payload communication station at his
console. The M/S handling of most communications unloaded the P/Ss, who
were overburdened with direct experiment operation duties. Also, the M/S
frequently served to support the P/Ss in operating functions. This ream
approach was very smooth and successful.
During integration and operation of the payload for Level IV and
for Launch Site Payload Processing, the M/S was very valuable as an
operations and training coordinator for the payload flight crew.
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(d)
(e)
(f)
The participation of M/S and P/S (time of selection, training schedule,
etc.) should be included as an integral part of the mission planning so
that their involvement begins at the optimum time comimensurate with their
assignments. In particular, P/S involvement should commence at a stage
that would al l ow their inputs to the control and operations aspects of
the experiment design.
ASSESS II P/Ss were selected eight months before flight. By the time
they got to most of the He for training, much of the hardware design was
solidified. As in ASSESS I, the P/Ss all made strong observations that
their early input to design would have been very helpful toward making
experiment operation more conducive to successful operation of the hardware
and obtaining science data.
Effective verbal communication skills should be an important criterion for
P/S selection.
During ASSESS II, it was noticeable that some P/Ss were significantly
less adept at giving and receiving information than others, with a tendency
to communicate less effectively under stress. This affected the success of
making repairs and collecting data. This aspect of competence must not be
neglected when making P/S selection for Spacelab.
Prior to final selection, P/S candidates should be subjected to some type of
stress, including timeline activity.
Observations indicated that the ability of P/Ss to operate under
stress of multiple activity varied considerably. In Europe, psychological
tests were used that clearly eliminated some P/S candidates and raised
concerns about others. These concerns were borne out on ASSESS II during
the integration and flight periods.
Any PI candidate for P/S must be fully cognizant of the workload time
commitment and demonstrate his ability to support both roles.
On ASSESS II, one P/S was also a PI. Some interference was noted when
he interrupted his ASSESS II activity to take care of urgent PI management
responsibilities. Very careful consideration should be given to any PI who
proposes to be a P/S on Spacelab to assure his genuine willingness to forego
his basic PI duties, or have them handled by others, and that he thoroughly
understands the time required away from his home base for meetings, training,
and operational duties associated with the Spacelab payload.
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(g) The use of backup P/S from the Mission Management team it feasible, b,%
practicability depends upon the balance of duties required for a specific
mission.
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For ASSESS II, the U. S. Assistant Mission Manager was selected to be
backup P/S for U.S. experiments. This plan for a single backup for both U.S.
P/Ss was adopted particularly to save travel funds, and the individual was
considered to be well acquainted with the U.S. experiments. Ilia management
duties were severely diluted, but he handled P/S training and generally
represented the payload crew to management during the pre-flight phases in
addition to undergoing his own limited training. The question arises as
to whether capable candidates will be willing to accept only a backup
assignment for Spacelab, with historically a very low probability of Flight
assignment, unless there is some accompanying responsible assignment (which
dilutes both jobs), or some strong liklihood that a backup P/S assignment
is a step toward prime assignment on another mission.
Each crew candidate should be subjected to sufficiently realistic functional
and environmental simulation of his roles early in the training period to
permit self-evaluation of his desire to proceed.
Some substantial physical difficulties were experienced with the
medical experiment by one P/S during the 72-hour collection of P/S preflight
baseline medical data at ARC. The problem was sufficiently severe that,
due to potential loss of medical data and/or degradation of his overall
effectiveness, consideration was given to replacing him for the flight
mission. However, in the actual mission, the medical data was collected
and there was no detectable degredation of P/S performance due to the
medical experiment.
P!S training must be tailored to the individual P/S selected and the
complexity and degree of P/S understanding of any given experiment.
PIs must devote adequate time and effort to maximize the training
effectiveness.
On ASSESS II, P/Ss training was somewhat varied. Initial training
was scheduled on a time basis per experiment without regard to P/S capability
of initial, understanding of experiments, but some adjustments were made as
training progressed. Discussions with P/Ss after the mission indicated
that training, in some cases, had been overdone for some experiments and
inadequate for others. Mission management judgment should be blended with
P/S desires to schedule training time consistent with the background and
capability of each P/S for every experiment and its priority.
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NASA should consider means to provide independent travel fund support for
'P/Ss from Centers where this factor can prevent nomination.
The problem of selecting a P/S from a NASA Center raises the problem
of devoting extensive travel funds to a single individual and organization
with a center for benefit of others on Spacelab. The travel fund problem
is so severe within NASA, under the present system, that any NASA organization
is extremely reluctant to expend travel funds except for local benefit. For
ASSESS II, the travel fund problem was very severe. Where payloads came from
several organizations, special travel fund arrangements may be necessary to
attract the best P/Ss.
P/S participation in development of experiment operation procedures contributes
significantly to their training and operational understanding, and supports
their responsibility as the onboard PI representative.
For ESA experiments, the P/Ss were given the responsibility to develop
operational flight procedures for their assigned experiments. This proved
'	 to be a very effective method to assure their complete understanding of
experiment operation, and caused a very deep interaction with the PI to
iterate various modes of operation. The further hands-on operational
responsibility assigned to the P/S during LeNel IV and launch site
integrat7lons was an excellent combination to maximize P/S training for
flight. NASA chose to have the PIs maintain responsibility for all
procedure generation with review and iteration with the P/Ss. No difference
in P/S operational success could be detected due to this different approach.
(1) Flight operations workload planning must allow for a P/S adaptation period,
with attendant lower effectiveness for the first several days of the mission.
Even without the effects of zero-g, for ASSESS II the P/Ss readily
stated that they required from one to three aircraft flights before they
had reached a high degree of effectiveness in experiment operation. The
P/S who had many details to consider but was concerned with only one
operational goal developed operational effectiveness more rapidly than those
faced with a multiplA city of operational goals (single vs multiple experiment
operations). Even the M/S, with his considerable flight experience, felt
that he was not handling his several duties with full efficiency until about
the third flight. Increased experiment/system level training can minimize,
but not eliminate, the initial lower effectiveness.
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5.6 Flight/Ground Operations Interactions
Adequate resources and time must be provided for training of POCC personnel,
especially PI science tr.ams.
The POCC for ASSESS II was fully manned as planned for Spacelab.
Some POCC training occurred for ESA personnel during the ESA integration
and operation activity in Europe, but very little operational training took
place at Ames before the start of flight operations. Total plans for
training at ARC could not be exercised due to minimum schedule time, total
launch team workload, and the minimum on site PI support teams. Initial
operations were inefficient, but improved with time. Whereas experienced
management personnel may man key positions for Spacelab, which eliminates
their training needs, most PIs will be untrained. PI participation in
flight communications was very poor in many cases during ASSESS II,
especially during the early flight period. Leadership of the PI group
in the POCC by the Mission Scientist was very good, but some training for
that arrangement is recommended.
Tne TV text uplink is a beneficial mission operations tool. Facsimile
capacity for transmission of troubleshooting information is desirable
and should be incorporated into the Spacelab concept at an early date.
The TV text uplink and its Polaroid readout in the aircraft proved its
utility by being used increasingly as the ASSESS II mission progressed. The
ability to send simple messages to P/Ss and the M/S, with a record for
reference, was found to be far less interruptive of work than extensive
voice communication. Inability of the link to handle facsimile precluded
sending wiring diagrams that were needed for troubleshooting.
Periodic data samples from the Spacelab to the POCC during the mission
are essential for PI experiment surveillance and to provide operations
instructions back to the Spacecraft.
Data slices were passed to the POCC each day, and gro.md-based
facilities were available through the POCC to d-termine the effectiveness
of experiment operation. This system was highly successful, and is
recommended for Spacelab. Some probl:ms occurred with data interfaces to
the experiments, but in every case a work-around was implemented so that
nearly all data was retrieved.
i
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If backup P/Ss are to be used effectively in the POCC, they must be trained
on all experiments. Also, on joint missions, Mission Scientists must be
familiar with all experiments.
During ASSESS I_I, in-flight communication between the POCC and the M/S
primarily concerned experiment operation and experiment troubleshooting.
Communication is much more efficient if both sender and receiver are conversant
to a reasonable level of detail with all aspects of the payload. For ASSESS II,
the backup P/Ss served as the maiu POCC communicators and their payload
training, along with close familarity with the flight crew, made this very
effective.
The Mission Scientist must be conversant with the payload to a
considerable level of detail so that he can make decisions on the best
use of flight time. It is therefore imperative t-at he understand the
science and operation of all experiments.
5.7 Experiment Hardware Considerations
Automation of routine tasks is recommended in reducing P/S workload and
operating errors; however manual bypass capability is also desirable.
Experiments that contained automation of routine tasks and did not
require extensive adjustments or setup of controls by the P/S appeared to
have a higher data-take success ratio than those with extensive manual
setup and control. Two examples from ASSESS II illustrate this point.
The infrared telescope experiment was highly automated with computer
control. However, when the computer occasionally failed, adequate manual
operation by the P/S was possible. One U.S. experiment was also highly
automated with computer control, but not in such a way that the P/S could
easily bypass it. The PI recognized early in the mission that the data
was badly degraded, but gave no instructions to the P/S because there were
no suitable manual control provisions.
Use of off-the-shelf hardware should be considered where modifications or
testing to meet the Spacelab constraints is cost effective.
As in ASSESS I, the majority of the components that made up the
ASSESS II experiments were off-the-shelf items. Statistically they
performed as well as specially constructed components.. The primary reason
for resorting to special construction was the need for s unique functional
capability. Reliability, low power cono umyiLon, etc., were definitely
secondary considerations.
(d)
s:
(a)
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(a)
Payload integration and operations management personnel, as well as the
payload flight crew, should have available a complete set of simplified
schematics. These should clearly show all interface connections and
controls for ready reference during integration and operation when problems
occur.
During ASSESS II, except for Spacelab rack interfaces, PIs provided
intra-experiment and control diagrams in varying degrees of detail. Other
interface diagrams were hastily developed just prior to Launch Site Payload
Processing by the Systems Level Payload Integration team in cooperation with
members of the various PI teams. Over all, the level of detail in the
diagrams was not sufficient to permit integration management personnel to
efficiently pursue and solve problems. Even though it is recognized that
intra-experiment hardware is a PI responsibility, unless some reasonable
inner visibility is immediately available, internal components can cause
severe interface problems without a capability to quickly trace the
problem to the source.
5.8 Data Handling
Face-to-face interactive discussions betw°en responsible representatives
of the experiment and the central data system with a resulting bilateral
interface agreement, including verification, procedures, are necessary to
fully define and establish the data handling interface.
Interface resolution between experiments and the central data system
is traditionally one of the most difficult areas. Usually experiment
interface identification comes late in the process of experiment hardware
preparation, which compounds the problem. A reasonable understanding by
the experimenter of central data processor interface limitations may also
affect the experiment design, and should come early enough to prevent the
need for redesign. All of this dictates that experts from each side of
the interface start face-to-face discussions early and continue that type
of interaction until a firm interface is fully defined and agreed to by
both parties. Attempts to define this interface without extensive discussion
and understanding will almost guarantee problems except for the simplest
type of data interface.
For ASSESS II, the key data system experts were unfortunately not
broug:it into IRD discussions. This area turned out to be the most severe
problem area with persistent difficulty in several cases. For Spacelab,
proper early expenditures of travel funds and manpower in this area will
almost certainly be cost effective and save later severe problems.
(c)
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(a)
Hardware and software interfaces should Le standardized wherever possible
between the experiment and the central data system to simplify integration
and checkout and enhance operating reliability.
In the.ADDAS system, all analog data is generally received through
a single analog to digital converter that is sampled by standardized
software. Thus, any analog signal that conforms to the limitations of
the converter can be quickly and surely added to the data collection
system. Limiting C`.gital interfaces to a format and procedure for which
the central computer is designed likewise reduces the need for special
programming which s costly, prone to error, and generally makes
inefficient use of all resources.
Successful soft-fare debugging can be accomplished only if enough time is
provided wi'Ch	 experiments being stimulated simultaneously in the
planned flight configuration.
Although individual experiments to the central data system interfaces
should be well verified by the time the total integration phase commences,
interaction between experiment software modules can only be reliably tested
in a full system environment, and sufficient time must be allowed to identify
and solve total system problems which are almost guaranteed to show up. The
ASSESS II schedule did not provide sufficient debugging time with all
experiments operating, and consequently some severe data processing problems
occurred during flight. Software debugging should be expected to continue
well into payload integration, and with the real possibility that this type
of problem is likely to show up during flight, it is recommended that the
uplink be capable of handling data processing computer programs.
5.9 Documentation
The fidelity of document generation and late issuance during ASSESS II
resulted in lack of agreement among the participants on any immediate
(general conclusion for Spacelab on this subject. A separabeanalysis of
documentation will be undertaken.
Identification and review of documentation on ASSESS II was difficult
because very little documentation was generated until late in the project.
The early IRDs were not completed. Lack of complete analytical integration
did not produce the ingredients necessary for timely issuance of documents
which required that data. Thus, although the ground and flight operations
requirements documents were finally issued, they came too late for review
or strong application, and the resulting ground and flight plans were
consequently generated very late, mostly on the basis of informal inputs.
42
i_
(b) For joint NASA/ESA missions, both sides should have an opportunity to
review all basic mission documents. Some form of mission implementation
agreement should be developed and jointly agreed to by both parties.
This should identify those documents which commit each other's resources
or significantly impact mission objectives and should be concurred in by
both parties.
Dnring the progress of the ASSESS II mission, ESA management felt
they were being committed without recourse to certain lines of action by
i
	
NASA issued documentation. No formal means was developed during the
program for NASA/ESA discussion of such documents before their issue.
ESA feels that they must be able to discuss jointly those areas where
commitments of manpower are to be made before detailed policies are set
by NASA issued documents.
{
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Abbreviations_ and Acronyms
ADDAS
ARC
ASO
DFVLR
EMI
ESA
ESTEC
GHz
GSE
GSFC
HF
IR
IRD
IWG
JPL
JSC
KSC
LaRC
MCC
MSFC
M/S
MSG
um
NASA
OA
OH
OSF
PCU
PI
POCC
P/S
SPICE
STS
UHF
VHF
Airborne Digital Data Acquisition System
Ames Research Center
Airborne Science Office
Deutsche Forschungs-und Versuchsanstalt fur Luft-und
Raumfahrt (the German Natioual Space Agency)
Electromagnetic Interference
European Space Agency
European Space Technology Center
Gigahertz
Ground Support Equipment
Goddard Space Flight Center
High Frequency
Infrared
Investigator Requirements Document
Investigators' Working Group
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Langley Research Center
Mission Control Center
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mission Specialist
Mission Steering Group
Micrometer
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Applications
Hydroxyl
Office of Space Flight
Payload Checkout Unit
Principal Investigator
Payload Operations Control Center
Payload Specialist
Spacelab Payload Integration and Coordination in Europe
Space Transportation System
Ultra High Frequency
Very High Frequency
Experiment Designations
AEES	 Airborne Electromagnetic Emission Survey
Airglow University of Southampton
CAPO	 short for Capodimonte
IHR	 Infrared Heterodyne Radiometer
EMI	 EMI experiment
IRA	 Infrared Astronomy
LAS	 Laser Absorption Spectrometer
Medical Medical Experiment
SAR	 Synthetic Aperture Radar
MLS	 Microwave Limb Sounder
Reference 1: NASA/ESA CV-990 Spacelab Simulation - Executive Summary -
July 1975. NASA TM X-62,457 and ESA-SL-75-1.
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